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Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

Honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia

Information note by the co-rapporteurs on their fact-finding visit to Yerevan (10 – 12 May 2016)

Co-rapporteurs: Mr Alan Meale (United Kingdom, Socialist Group) and Mr Giuseppe Galati (Italy, Group of the European People's Party)

I. Introduction

1. This visit follows the adoption of the new Constitution of Armenia by referendum, which has changed the political system from a presidential republic, with a mixed election system, to a parliamentary republic, with a proportional election system. During our visit we focused on the implementation of the constitutional reform and in particular on the drafting of the new election code that was underway in the Armenian Parliament at the time of our visit². In addition, we discussed on the on-going fight against corruption in Armenia, especially in the light of the recommendations made in the Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Armenia, published by the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on 25 February 2016, which focuses on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. The statement we made following our visit is published in Appendix 1.

2. During our visit we met with, *inter alia*, the President of the Republic; the Prime Minister; the Minister of Justice; the Minister responsible for the co-ordination of the Cabinet of Ministers; the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly; the Chairman of the Committee on State and Legal Affairs of the National Assembly; the Chair of the Commission on Ethics for High Ranking Officials; the Deputy Prosecutor General of Armenia; the leadership of all individual factions in the National Assembly; the Chairman and members of the Armenian Delegation to PACE; members of the diplomatic community in Yerevan; as well as representatives of think tanks and civil society organisations in Armenia. The programme of our visit is attached to this note in Appendix 2.

3. We would like to thank the Armenian National Assembly for the excellent programme and hospitality, and the Head of the Council of Europe Office and her staff for the support given to our delegation, including with the organisation of the programme.

II. Political development and constitutional reform process

4. Our visit took place after the near collapse of the cease fire regime in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the unprecedented escalation of military hostilities along the line of contact, at the beginning of April 2016. The outbreak of these hostilities has had a profound impact on the political climate in the country. All the political forces we met stressed that they were united in their position on this issue and that they had

¹ Document declassifié par le Comité de suivi à sa réunion du 21 juin 2016.

² Following our visit, on 25 May 2016, the National Assembly adopted the Electoral Code in third and final reading with 102 votes in favour, 17 against and 3 abstentions.

agreed that any domestic political disagreements would not be allowed to develop to such extent that it could undermine the stability and security of their country. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its resolution is not part of the monitoring procedure for either Armenia or Azerbaijan. This is firmly within the remit of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has intensified its efforts since the four-day war in April. However, both Armenia and Azerbaijan committed themselves upon accession to the Council of Europe to resolve any conflicts with other countries – including between them – peacefully, which is an obligation incumbent on all member States³. In addition, Armenia committed itself to to “*use its considerable influence over the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to foster a solution to the conflict*”⁴. The outbreak of military hostilities seems to clearly contradict this commitment by both countries. The exact sequence of events and responsibility for the escalation of military hostilities is hotly disputed between the belligerents. This underscores the urgent need for an independent and impartial incident investigation mechanism to investigate violations of the cease fire regime along the line of contact. In that respect we strongly welcome the announcement by the OSCE Minsk Co-Chairs that the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have both agreed to the establishment of such an incident investigation mechanism under the aegis of the OSCE, which will be a crucial mechanism to strengthen the cease fire regime.

5. With regard to the outbreak of hostilities along the line of contact in April, we heard repeated and persistent allegations of atrocities and possible war crimes having been committed during the hostilities. These reports need to be impartially and independently investigated, preferably in the framework of the Minsk Group, and if proven, those responsible should be held fully accountable and prosecuted under national and international humanitarian and human rights law. If left without investigation, these reports will continue to be a source of mistrust and tension between the parties to the conflict. In our view, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights could provide an invaluable service in this respect and all parties should be urged to consider allowing him unrestricted access to the region.

6. We outlined the constitutional reform in our previous information note. In line with the constitutional provisions, the amendments to the Constitution were adopted by constitutional referendum on 6 December 2015.

7. Regrettably, the referendum was marred by allegations of irregularities, including of vote buying, pressure on voters, and isolated reports of ballot stuffing. For its part, the authorities pointed to the fact that several of the observing NGOs were part of the “No” campaign, and therefore questioned the objectivity and veracity of their findings and conclusions. The Prosecutors Office has announced that it has started investigations on the basis of the allegations made and irregularities had indeed been found, but their scale and impact, according to the Prosecutors Office, was minor. No international election observation mission (IEOM) was deployed for this referendum. The OSCE/ODIHR send a two-person limited expert mission for the referendum and the Assembly deployed a three-person referendum presence, which was too small to either authoritatively confirm or dismiss the allegations of electoral wrongdoing. However, it regretted that the authorities had not been able to increase public trust in the integrity of the referendum process, while at the same time regretting that the polarised political climate in Armenia had dominated the referendum environment. Without wishing to comment on the merits and veracity of the allegations, it is clear from the referendum process that public trust in the electoral system is still low and that the referendum did not provide the unambiguous democratic credibility to the constitutional reforms that was hoped it would do.

8. The change from a presidential to a parliamentary political system will take effect when the term of the current President ends in 2018. The first key event that will set this change into motion will be the election of the new parliament, on the basis of a proportional system, in 2017. The new President, whose office will become largely ceremonial, will be elected by the new parliament. The current President will maintain the considerable powers granted to him by the old Constitution until he leaves office.

9. As a result of the change of political system and the manner in which parliament will be elected, the constitutional reform process focussed on the drafting of a new electoral code, which also got most of the public attention. That notwithstanding, the Minister of Justice informed us that her Ministry, in co-operation with the national parliament, was preparing several new laws as well as a considerable number of amendments to existing legislation in order to implement the new Constitution and bring current legislation in line with its provisions.

³ Opinion 221 (2001) § 13.2 and Opinion 222 (2001) § 14.2

⁴ Opinion 221 (2001) § 13.2-b

III. Electoral reform

10. Following the adoption of the constitutional amendments by referendum on 6 December 2015, the government started the drafting of the election code. The preliminary draft was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of Armenia on 3 March 2016. This draft was then presented to the political stakeholders. In the view of the government, the preliminary draft it proposed was meant as a basis for discussions on a final draft. However, some stakeholders expressed their regret that they were not consulted when the preliminary draft was prepared, which they fear could narrow the scope for discussion.

11. After the publication of the preliminary draft of the election code, the opposition proposed that a special working group be established, consisting of four members of the government/ruling coalition, four members of the opposition and four members from the civil society (the so-called 4+4+4 group) with a view to agreeing on an election code that would have the support of most, if not all, political stakeholders. The authorities agreed to this proposal and the group was established under the chairmanship of Davit Harutyunyan, Minister responsible for the co-ordination of the Cabinet of Ministers, and former Chair of the Armenian delegation to our Assembly.

12. During our visit, we were informed that the discussions in the 4+4+4 group, upon initiative of the opposition parties, had focussed on the mechanisms that should be included in the electoral code to make the election system more robust and resistant against fraudulent activities. The joint opposition parties and NGO representatives made a number of demands in this regard, including, *inter alia*, the publication of the signed voters lists after the elections; installation of cameras with a live feed on the web in all polling stations; cleaning of the voters lists; and introduction of inking of the voters' fingers.

13. On 15 February 2016, the authorities requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft election code. Following the negotiations in the 4+4+4 group, revised election codes were sent to the Venice Commission on 6 and 18 April 2016. In order to assist in the drafting process in parliament, the Venice Commission published its opinion⁵, produced jointly with the OSCE/ODIHR on 10 May 2016, during our visit to Yerevan. The final opinion was adopted by the Venice Commission at its 107th plenary session from 9 to 10 June 2016.

14. In its preliminary opinion, the Venice Commission concluded that the new code could form an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections. At the same time the Venice Commission underscored that the key challenge for genuinely democratic elections is the exercise of commensurate political will by all election stakeholders to implement the election code fully and entirely, both in spirit and according to the letter of the law.

15. The Venice Commission noted the short time available for the drafting of the law, which had at times affected the inclusiveness of the drafting process. As underscored by the Venice Commission, the electoral code is very complex – also as a result of the many innovations that are contained in the law which, although often also existing in other countries, are unique in their combination. Many of these features are related to the overall goal of ensuring a stable governing majority, an objective which understandingly is considered important in the geopolitical context of the country.

16. In order to obtain such a stable majority, the new electoral code proposes a number of mechanisms, including the possibility of organising a second round of elections between the two parties or coalitions of parties that won the most seats in the first round of the elections.

17. In the event that a party or a coalition wins an absolute majority of the mandates in the first round (53 out of 105), no second round will be organised. Parties have the possibility to form coalitions after the first round. However, the number of parties or pre-election coalitions that can form governing alliance is limited to three. If a coalition can be created that has a majority of mandates no second round will be held. If no majority can be formed, a second round will be organised between the two parties or coalitions of parties that between them won the most mandates in the first round. Parties and coalitions can form new alliances in order to qualify for and compete in the second round. There is no limit to the number of parties and blocs that can form an alliance to participate in the second round. Parties that do not participate in the second round will maintain the mandates they won in the first round and parties that participate in the second round will not have less mandates than they gained in the first round⁶. An additional mechanism in the law aimed at ensuring a stable majority is a majority bonus that ensures that a party or coalition that has a majority will

⁵ CDL-PI(2016)004

⁶ In line with constitutional provisions the exact number of seats in the parliament is flexible. The minimum number is 105: 101 normal seats and 4 extra seats reserved for minority representatives.

automatically have at least 54% of the mandates in parliament. As a unique feature, intended to strengthen the role of the opposition, the opposition will obtain automatically 1/3 of the mandates after the elections if the parties that form the government have more than 2/3 of the mandates among them. Thus, the opposition has never less than one third of the votes in the parliament.

18. The Venice Commission opinion welcomes that a number of previous Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations have been addressed in the electoral code. However, it also notes that a number of significant concerns remain in the draft code, such as insufficient measures to enhance the stakeholders' confidence in the voters' lists, lack of clarity with regard to appeals procedures and safeguards against the abuse of administrative resources.

19. We fully concur with the Venice Commission's concerns about the complexity of the code, which could have an impact on public trust in the electoral system, which is a key requirement for the conduct of genuinely democratic elections. We therefore welcomed the willingness of the authorities to continue co-operating with the Venice Commission with a view to addressing the concerns expressed in the preliminary opinion.

20. In our view, the introduction of the new political system in Armenia could potentially reward parties that are willing to co-operate and enter into political coalitions, which could counteract the zero-sum mentality that has regrettably been prevalent in Armenia's political environment, often at the cost of its democratic consolidation. In this regard, we already expressed in our previous note our concern about some of the mechanisms introduced to obtain a stable majority in Armenia (often referred to as the Italian model). This was compounded by our concern that, in the context of the suspicion among a number of political forces that the constitutional and electoral changes were introduced with the sole objective of perpetuating the power of the ruling majority, the Italian model could have an effect on the trust of the stakeholders in the new election system. In particular, we are concerned about the provisions that give parties or coalitions only three days to form a governing majority before a second round of elections is called. We therefore welcome the indications that the period to form a coalition will be extended. In addition we are concerned about the limit of three parties to form a governing majority after the first round of elections. We urge the authorities to remove this limit from the election code.

21. The opposition parties have asked for the signed voters' lists to be published after the elections. The unrestricted publication of signed voters' lists after elections would run counter to Venice Commission standards. However, it could be acceptable if it is made available to stakeholders for a limited time within a controlled environment, for instance to registered proxies in a polling station in case of justified complaints or within the framework of a court order, again to registered proxies or representatives, in the case of election related appeals. We were informed that a compromise has been found between the authorities and opposition parties where the number on the voter list of each voter that has voted would be published for a limited time after the elections. We welcome any compromise that could enhance the trust in the conduct of the vote while at the same time respecting data protection and secrecy of vote principles. At the same time we wish to emphasise that other methods exist to effectively counter voter personification and multiple voting – including the inking of voters' fingers with indelible ink – that do not potentially infringe on the secrecy of votes and could be considered by the political stakeholders.

22. Instead of inking of voters fingers, the authorities have proposed a new electronic voter identification system that would register the fingerprints of each voter. The authorities assert that this system would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for a person to vote more than once, while in case of an election dispute all fingerprints could be compared on a national scale⁷. While – from its description – we understand that the system could make a serious contribution to preventing multiple voting, its efficiency in this respect would depend on the final specifications as well as its capacity to check against a database that contains information from multiple polling stations. However, we note that electronic systems are often regarded with suspicion by the general public, while their deployment would imply a considerable financial investment. The certification of the systems and their robustness during the election process will therefore be important factors to ensure the required public trust in such a system.

23. The opposition has also requested that video cameras be installed in all polling stations, and that these cameras provide a live feed on the internet that would be publicly accessible. While this issue is not addressed in the Venice Commission's opinion on the draft election code, we note that the Venice Commission has opposed the installation of cameras in polling stations in other countries.

⁷ It is not clear to us if on election day this system will check a fingerprint online against a national database or against a local dataset, with the possibility for a country-wide comparison after the elections in case of election complaints.

24. In the draft election code, the authorities proposed a mechanism whereby the voters' list will be audited twice a year to ensure its accuracy. The opposition proposed that an initial cleaning and verification of the voters list be carried out before the next elections in a joint exercise of opposition parties and authorities, similar to what took place in Georgia ahead of the 2012 elections. While the verification process in Georgia was not without its problems it did indeed contribute to the trust of the voters in the voters' lists and ensured that both the authorities and the opposition had to take joint responsibility for its accuracy. As a result the voters' list was much less of a concern for the stakeholders than during previous elections in Georgia. For those reasons we would recommend that the authorities explore the possibility of a joint verification of the voters' list based on best practices elsewhere. Opposition parties for their part should then also publicly take co-responsibility for the accuracy of the lists to ensure that such an exercise results in a marked increase of public trust in these lists and the electoral process based on them.

25. The new Constitution stipulates that the new electoral code has to enter into force by 1 July 2016, in order to allow for sufficient time before the next parliamentary elections, also given that the Venice Commission guidelines recommend that no changes to the electoral code be made in the year before elections take place. This gave the drafters only a short window for the drafting and adoption of the electoral code, which affected the inclusiveness of the consultation process, in particular in the early phases of the drafting of the code when the 4+4+4 group was not yet established. On 29 April 2016, the draft election code was adopted in first reading by the parliament and adopted in final reading on 25 May 2016. Both opposition and ruling majority reportedly have pledged that they will continue to seek consensus on aspects of the code.⁸

IV. Fight against corruption

26. On 25 February 2016, the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) published its Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Armenia, which focuses on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. It should be noted that this report was drafted before the amendments to the Constitution were adopted. During our visit we were informed that a number of GRECO recommendations have been addressed by the constitutional amendments, especially in relation to the independence of the judiciary and prosecution.

27. As noted by GRECO, the fight against corruption has been high on the agenda of the authorities and GRECO welcomes the many reforms that have been introduced in the recent years in that respect. However, endemic corruption continues to be a serious problem in the country, with the public perception of corruption, especially of the judiciary, continuing to be very high. In that respect the GRECO report pointed at the continuing lack of independence of the judiciary and the broad powers of the President, combined with a relatively weak National Assembly. A number of these underlying factors have been addressed by the constitutional amendments although the extent of the effect of them on the level of corruption, and the perception thereof, cannot yet be assessed.

28. The adoption in 2011 of the Law on Public Service was an important development in the fight against corruption. This law introduced ethics rules, corruption prevention measures, as well as the declaration of assets for civil servants and associated categories of officials, including judges, prosecutors and MPs. In addition the GRECO report notes positive steps such as the judiciary reforms of 2014 as well as changes to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) that enhance the independence and accountability of the prosecution service.

29. Concerning members of parliament, the GRECO report notes that by law MPs cannot be involved in entrepreneurial or other economic activities and that a set of rules on ethics, including on the reception of gifts, are now in place. The adherence to these rules is monitored by an ethics committee in the parliament consisting of MPs of all the political parties in the parliament and is chaired alternatively by a member of the largest party in the ruling majority and a member of the largest party in the opposition. However, GRECO also noted that the rules are rather vague and often ignored or not effectively implemented, while no sanctions exist in reality for violations of the rules on ethics⁹. As noted by several international observers, a considerable overlap exists in Armenia between economic and political elites and interests, which undermine public trust in the political system.

30. With regard to transparency of parliamentary procedure, which is an important tool to fight corruption and conflicts of interest, GRECO notes that the government is obliged to organise public consultations before

⁸ <https://www.armenianow.com/en/news/politics/2016/05/25/armenia-electoral-code-vote-parliament-harutyunyan/3862/>

⁹ An MP can be deprived of his mandate for being engaged in economic activities while being an MP but the definition of economic activities is rather vague.

sending a draft law to the parliament. However, this is not required for bills introduced by individual parliamentarians. The National Assembly and committee sittings are generally public¹⁰, but GRECO notes that committee agendas and minutes are not made public, which undermines the transparency of committee work and limits the possibility for public intervention. GRECO also points at the fact that laws are regularly discussed under urgent procedure, which limits the time civil society can prepare itself or react to new draft laws. GRECO has urged the authorities to address these issues.

31. Immunity of MPs is often mentioned as an obstacle to the fight against corruption in Armenia. However, in its report GRECO stated that its findings do not corroborate this view.

32. Corruption among the judiciary, and the public perception that corruption is endemic in this sector, is a key problem in Armenia, as acknowledged by the authorities. While the Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, and judges are required to declare any undue interference in their work, the independence of the judiciary continues to be problematic and judges are subjected to external and internal (from hieratically higher judges) interference, often amounting to *de facto* instructions. This is a key issue that needs to be resolved, including for the overall fight against corruption in Armenia. There is an elaborate, sometimes overlapping system of judicial self-government in Armenia, which gives considerable powers to the Chair of the Cassation Court, including with regard to appointments, promotions and disciplinary procedures. This centralisation of power is problematic and should be addressed by the authorities.

33. Under the old Constitution, the President of Armenia had considerable powers over the appointment and dismissal of judges. His power to appoint judges will disappear when the new Constitution comes into force. During our visit we urged the authorities to ensure that the new procedures for the appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges are in line with Council of Europe standards and guarantee, as well as strengthen, the independence (*de jure* and *de facto*) of the judiciary. In that respect, GRECO recommended that the possibility to appeal against decisions related to appointment and dismissal in a court of law be introduced. Judges have very broad immunity from criminal prosecution, disproportional to the needs of an independent judiciary. This undermines the fight against corruption among the judiciary. GRECO has also urged the authorities, as a priority, to put an effective policy and legal framework in place to combat undue influence on judges and interference in their work, both by internal and external actors.

34. The prosecution service is autonomous and independent from any other branch of State power. It is one of the strongest branches of judicial power and is widely seen as dominating the judicial process, a legacy of the years of the Soviet "*procuratora*" system. The prosecution system is a hierarchical system headed by the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the parliament upon nomination by the President. GRECO has recommended that the rules governing the appointment process be strengthened to ensure a merit-based process that is resistant to political influence, which in turn would strengthen public trust in the prosecution service. GRECO has also recommended increasing the representation of prosecutors in the prosecutorial council (or collegium) and strengthening its role in the appointment and promotion of regular prosecutors, with a view to strengthening the independence of the prosecution service. As was recommended for judges, the possibility to appeal appointment- and dismissal-related decisions in a court of law should be introduced.

35. Ethical regulations for MPs, judges and prosecutors should be strengthened. The Law on the Civil Service established a Commission on Ethics for High Raking Officials. The law stipulates that the high level officials covered by the law should declare their assets as well as those of their nearest family, as well as economic activity, if permitted, and possible conflicts of interest. However, as noted in the GRECO report, the procedure for the declaration of assets and reception of gifts needs to be strengthened and effective implementation ensured. In addition, effective sanctions for transgressions, such as wilfully incorrect submissions or omissions, must be put in place. During our visit we were informed that, in response to the GRECO recommendations, the authorities are in the process of drafting a law that would strengthen the regulations and give the Commission on Ethics for High Raking Officials concrete means to ensure enforcement, including credible sanctions for transgressions. In addition, we recommended that the authorities broaden the categories of persons covered by the ethics and assets regulations in the Law on the Civil Service. In that respect we welcome the reforms implemented by the Prosecutors Office in recent years, which have increased the number of prosecutors that are subject to ethical regulations in the Civil Service Law and the Law on the Prosecution Service.

¹⁰ The few exceptions deal mainly with issues affecting National Security.

Appendix 1: Statement by the co-rapporteurs issued on 23 May 2016**Armenia monitors encourage all political forces to seek consensus on new election code**

Following a visit to Yerevan, the co-rapporteurs for the monitoring of Armenia by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Alan Meale (United Kingdom, SOC) and Guiseppe Galati (Italy, EPP/CD), have urged all political forces in Armenia to continue their dialogue on the new electoral code, and to seek compromise in order achieve as wide a consensus as possible.

“The new election system and electoral code, if implemented properly, could usher in an important new phase in Armenia’s democratic development,” they said. “At the same time we fully concur with the Venice Commission’s concerns about the complexity of the code, which could have an impact on public trust in the electoral system,” which they said was a key requirement for the conduct of genuinely democratic elections. “We therefore welcome the clearly expressed willingness of the authorities to continue co-operating closely with the Venice Commission in order to address its recommendations and concerns, as was the case during the adoption of the Constitutional amendments.”

In the view of the co-rapporteurs, the introduction of the new political system in Armenia could potentially reward parties that are willing to co-operate and enter into political coalitions, which could counteract the zero-sum mentality that has regrettably been prevalent in Armenia’s political environment, often at the cost of its democratic consolidation. In that respect, the co-rapporteurs expressed their concern at provisions in the draft electoral code that would prohibit coalitions of more than three parties from forming a government after the first round of voting, and which give very little time for parties to form a governing coalition before a second round of elections is called. They therefore welcomed indications that the period to form a coalition would be extended and called upon the ruling majority to consider dropping the three-party limit to form a government after the first round.

With regard to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the rapporteurs expressed their concern at the ongoing tension along the line of contact following the escalation of military hostilities in April. They welcomed the announcement of the OSCE Minsk Co-chairs that the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed to the establishment of an incident investigation mechanism under the aegis of the OSCE, which would be important for strengthening the ceasefire regime. In addition, they stated: “We were informed of allegations of atrocities and possible war crimes having been committed during the recent outbreak of hostilities. These reports need to be fully and independently investigated, preferably in the framework of the Minsk Group, and if proven, those responsible should be held fully accountable and prosecuted under national and international humanitarian and human rights law. If left without investigation, these reports will continue to be a source of mistrust and tension between the parties to the conflict.”

During the visit the co-rapporteurs also held talks about the ongoing fight against corruption, which continues to be a serious problem in Armenia. They welcomed the fact that a new law is being drafted that would allow the Commission for Ethics of High Ranking Officials to impose sanctions on any high officials, including MPs and members of the government, that fail to register, or intentionally incorrectly register, any assets, gifts or conflicts of interest, in line with GRECO recommendations. At the same time, the co-rapporteurs called on the authorities to enlarge the number of officials that would be covered by the provisions on ethics, assets and conflicts of interest in the civil service and related laws.

The co-rapporteurs will present an information note regarding this visit to the Monitoring Committee in June. They expect to visit the country again in the autumn of 2016.

Appendix 2: Programme of the fact-finding visit to Yerevan (11-12 May 2016)

Mr Alan Meale, United Kingdom, Socialist Group, SOC
Mr Giuseppe Galati, Italy, EPP/CD

Wednesday, 11 May 2016

Meetings organised by the Council of Europe Office in Yerevan

08.00 Briefing on current situation by the Head of the Council of Europe Office (breakfast meeting)
09.00 Round table with civil society representatives and think tanks on recent political developments and constitutional reforms
Round table with experts and civil society representatives on electoral reform

12.30 Lunch

Meetings in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia

14.00 Meeting with "Heritage" Faction

14.35 Meeting with "Armenian Revolutionary Federation" Faction

15.10 Meeting with "Rule of Law" Faction

15.45 Meeting with "Armenian National Congress" Faction

16.20 Meeting with "Prosperous Armenia" Faction

16.55 Meeting with "Republican" (RPA) Faction

17.25 Meeting with Mr Hovhannes Sahakyan, Chair of the Standing Committee on State and Legal Affairs

18.00 Meeting with Ms Hermine Naghdalyan, Chair of the Armenian Delegation to PACE and Members of the Delegation

19.00 Dinner on behalf of Ms Hermine Naghdalyan, Vice President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia

Thursday, 12 May 2016

09:00 Meeting with representatives of the international Community in Yerevan

11.00 Meeting with Ms Siranush Sahakyan, Chair of the Commission on ethics for High Ranking Officials

12.30 Working lunch with Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Minister – Chief of Government Staff

14.00 Meeting with Mr Hovik Abrahamyan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

15.00 Meeting with the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Armenia

17.00 Meeting with Ms Arpine Hovhannisyan, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Armenia

18.00 Meeting with H.E. Mr Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia

19.00 Dinner