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Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland

Information note by the co-rapporteurs on their fact-finding visit to Warsaw (3 to 5 April 2017)

Co-rapporteurs: Mr Yves Cruchten, Luxembourg, Socialist Group, and Mr Thierry Mariani, France, Group of the European People's Party

I. Introduction

1. On 4 February 2016, Mr Schennach and others tabled a motion for a resolution on the functioning of democratic institutions in Poland. In this motion the authors expressed their concern that *“reforms and changes, in particular with regard to the functioning of the Constitutional Court, the new broadcasting law or the new police law have given rise to concerns about the continued commitment of Poland to the main principles of the Council of Europe, in particular with regard to the rule of law”*². On 27 May 2016, the Bureau of the Assembly seized the Monitoring Committee for report on the functioning of democratic institutions in Poland. On 23 June 2016 the Monitoring Committee appointed us as co-rapporteurs for this report. In addition to the situation regarding the Constitutional Court and the already mentioned surveillance law, also the recent changes to the law on the Prosecution Services, changes to the legal framework that govern demonstrations and rallies as well as the planned reforms in the judiciary were important areas of attention during our visit.

2. During our visit we met with, *inter alia*, the President of the Supreme Court of Poland, the Undersecretaries of State for Culture and Internal Affairs, the Ombudsperson, the Chairman and members of the High Council of Justice, the leadership of all parliamentary political parties, the Chairman of the Polish Bar Association; the previous President of the Constitutional Court, high level officials of the Ministry of Justice, representatives of non-governmental organisations, including journalist organisations, as well as representatives of the OSCE-ODIHR. The programme of our visit is attached to this note in Appendix 1.

3. We would like to thank the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly for the organisation of our programme and the kind assistance provided during our visit. We would also like to thank the Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights for their assistance in organising our meetings with civil society. At the same time we would like to express our deepest regret that neither the President or members of the Constitutional Court, nor the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister – or their representatives – nor the Minister of Justice, were willing to meet with our delegation, despite the central role being played by these personalities in the developments and ensuing political and constitutional crisis that the Assembly requested us to report on. We hope that meetings with these personalities and institutions will take place during a future visit for the preparation of our report.

II. Background

¹ Document declassified by the Monitoring Committee at its meeting on 15-16 May 2017.

² Doc. 13978(2016)

4. The political crisis began after the parliamentary elections in 2015. These elections took place in the context of an increasingly polarised political climate and the growing dissatisfaction of the Polish public with the ruling elite in the country. General elections, both for the Sejm and the Senate, were held on 25 October 2015. They were won by the Law and Justice Party (also known by its Polish acronym, PiS) which gained 235 seats out of 460 in the lower Chamber of Parliament, the Sejm, thus obtaining an absolute majority.³ This is the first time since free and fair elections were held in Poland in 1991 that one single party has had an absolute majority. However it did not gain sufficient mandates to have the two-thirds majority needed to change the Polish Constitution. The Civic Platform, which had been in power for eight years with its coalition partner, the Polish People's Party, gained 138 seats (losing 59). The United Left, which ran as a coalition of left-leaning parties, did not pass the 8% threshold for party coalitions to enter parliament.

5. In the view of the PiS, its overwhelming election victory gave it a clear popular mandate for profound reform of the political system and Polish society. However, at the same time it felt that the state structures and democratic institutions were dominated by, and therefore biased in favour of, the previous authorities, which would hinder the implementation of its reform agenda. The new ruling majority therefore ostensibly set out to what it considered to be the "de-politicisation" of these institutions and bring them under the control of the new authorities. In that context, the first institution in its sights was the Constitutional Court which had considerable legal powers to block or hinder its ambitious reform programme if this was not in line with constitutional provisions. The ruling majority's perception of the Constitutional Court as an impediment to its reform programme was strengthened by the fact that the previous ruling majority had changed the law governing the appointment of Constitutional Court judges to allow the previous majority to fill all five positions that would become available in the Constitutional Court in 2015, including two that would become available only after the elections had taken place. This was seen by the new authorities as a clear stacking of the Court by the previous authorities in order to protect its interest after the elections in which it was clear the latter would lose their control over the levers of power.

6. Immediately after the elections the new ruling majority set out to rectify this – for it – unacceptable situation and to install its own supporters in the Constitutional Court. This was done in such a manner that it soon escalated into a full blown constitutional crisis, which will be outlined below. This crisis was reinforced by the fact that the new authorities set out to implement a number of other reforms of other institutions, in particular the public media, police and judiciary, which the PiS felt were dominated and controlled by the previous authorities. These controversial attempts by the new authorities to bring constitutionally independent State institutions under its control prompted a national and international outcry cumulating in the opening of a Rule of Law procedure in respect of Poland by the European Commission. This was the first time such a procedure had been opened by the Commission in respect of one of its member States.

7. From our meetings, it seems that – at this moment – the rule of law procedure is in stalemate. While the Commission considers that the replies of the Polish authorities to its formal inquiries are insufficient, it believes that the ball is now with the European Council that should decide what follow-up should be given. For its part, the European Council seems to take the position that any follow-up in this respect is firmly the responsibility of the European Commission. In this context, the relations between Poland and the European Union have continued to deteriorate, as highlighted by the developments around the re-election of Mr Tusk as President of the European Council.

8. In the course of the developments in the country, the Venice Commission was requested – including by the authorities themselves – to provide opinions on several pieces of legislation, especially related to the Constitutional Court. These opinions by Venice Commission, also expressed profound criticism and serious concerns regarding a number of provisions that were clearly in contradiction with European norms and standards. Regrettably, the Polish authorities reacted furiously to this criticism and openly questioned the impartiality of the Venice Commission. In our view this reaction by the Polish authorities was regrettable and unwarranted, and amounted to nothing more than a "killing of the messenger" reaction, which is unacceptable. We wish to use this opportunity to express our strongest appreciation of the high quality work by the Venice Commission and our ongoing trust in its impartiality.

III. Constitutional crisis

9. As mentioned above, the developments with regard to the Constitutional Court escalated into a fully blown constitutional crisis that has hampered the independent functioning of this important institution.

10. The Polish Constitutional Court is composed of 15 judges, elected by the Sejm by a simple majority for a non-renewable term of office of nine years. Candidates can be proposed by the Presidium of the Sejm, or

³ PiS also secured 61 seats out of 100 in the Senate.

by 50 MPs. The term of office of three of its judges was due to expire on 6 November 2015, and the tenure of another two was due to expire on 2 and 8 December 2015 respectively.

11. The crisis arguably started when, on 25 June 2015, three months before the parliamentary elections, the Sejm under the previous majority led by the Civic Platform (Sejm of the 7th convocation) adopted a law on the Constitutional Court, which allowed the outgoing Sejm to appoint the replacements for all Constitutional Court judges whose mandates expired in 2015. Thus, just before the elections, on 8 October 2015, the previous Sejm elected five new Constitutional Court judges. To be able to take up their duties, newly elected judges must be sworn in by the President in accordance with Article 21 (1) of the Constitutional Court Law. However, President Duda, who is from the Law and Justice Party, refused to take the oath of the five newly elected judges.

12. The law of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Court was challenged before the Constitutional Court by a number of deputies in the Sejm. On 3 December 2015, the Constitutional Court ruled that Article 137 of the law was unconstitutional insofar as it enabled the previous Sejm to elect two judges whose term of office would only expire after the first sitting of the new Sejm, i.e. in December 2015. The election by the previous Sejm of the three judges whose term of office expired on 6 November was deemed constitutional. The Court further considered that Article 21 (1) imposes an obligation upon the President to take the oath of newly elected judges without delay and that any other interpretation of this provision would be unconstitutional.

13. On 19 November 2015, the new Sejm adopted a series of controversial amendments to the law on the Constitutional Court that, inter alia, limited the tenure of the President of the Court to three years, renewable once; terminated the tenure of the sitting President and Vice-President of the Court; and stipulated that the term in office of a judge would only start after being sworn in by the President. These amendments were signed into force by President Duda the next day. On 25 November the Sejm adopted a resolution invalidating all five appointments of Constitutional Court Judges of 8 October 2015⁴ and appointing another five judges who were sworn in by President Duda the same night at 1.30 a.m. (!)

14. These amendments were appealed to the Constitutional Court that ruled on 9 December 2015 that, with the exception of the introduction of the three-year tenure for the President of the Court, the amendments of 19 November were unconstitutional. It also ruled that the Sejm could only have made two appointments on 25 November, and not five as three judges had been constitutionally elected by the previous Sejm.

15. According to Article 190 of the Constitution, the Tribunal's judgments are binding and final and should be published immediately in the official publication in which the original normative act was promulgated. On 10 December 2015, in a clear escalation of the crisis, the Prime Minister's Office however "suspended" the publication of the Court's judgment dated 3 December, arguing that the decision was taken without the participation of the five judges elected on 25 November.

16. On 22 December 2015, the Sejm adopted an additional set of amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court that, inter alia, stipulated that the Tribunal should in general hear cases in a full bench consisting of at least 13 out of 15 judges, who should make their decisions with a two-thirds majority. In the previous legislation the quorum of a full bench consisted of 9 judges, who could take decisions with a simple majority. In addition, the amendments stipulated that the Court should adjudicate cases in the sequence in which they were filed (so no prioritisation of important cases) and allowed the President of Poland or the Minister of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judge of the Constitutional Court. It is clear that the cumulative effect of these amendments was to intentionally render the functioning of the Constitutional Court in its legal, albeit politically disputed, composition impossible. These amendments were appealed with the Constitutional Court which agreed to hear the case in full bench on the basis of the previous non-amended law on the Constitutional Court. On 9 March 2016 the Constitutional Court held that the amendments of 22 December were unconstitutional. However, also in this case the authorities refused to publish the judgement.

17. On 23 December 2015, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on the amendments to the law on the Constitutional Court. This opinion was adopted by the Venice Commission during its plenary in March 2016⁵.

18. The Venice Commission notably reiterated that a democracy that respects the rule of law demands that the judgments of the courts, and especially the Constitutional Court, should be executed by the authorities. The Venice Commission therefore urged the Polish authorities to respect their international

⁴ So including the three appointments that were judged constitutional by the Constitutional Court.

⁵ CDL-AD(2016)001.

democratic and rule of law obligations and to publish and respect the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, it supported the position of the Constitutional Court that the amendments had to be heard on the basis of the un-amended version of the law

19. With regard to the amendments, the Venice Commission highlighted that the imposition of an obligation to hold a hearing and to decide on cases in strict chronological order of registration was not in compliance with European standards. Moreover, it found that a quorum of 13 out of 15 judges in combination with an obligation to take decisions with a qualified two-thirds majority was excessive and could only lead to a dysfunctional tribunal, in violation of European rule of law standards. It also expressed its concern about the provisions that would allow the President or Minister of Justice to start disciplinary proceedings against a Constitutional Court judge, which it considered were highly questionable and could affect the independence of the Court.

20. On 22 July 2016, the Sejm adopted a new law on the Constitutional Court. This new law addressed a number of Venice Commission recommendations in relation to the December amendments but left some concerns unaddressed. In a welcome development, the new law lowered the quorum for a full bench from 13 to 11 judges⁶, abolished the two-thirds qualified majority for decisions and reduced the cases that need to be heard in full bench, which together were seen as serious obstacles to the efficient functioning of the Court. Moreover, it removed the much criticised provision that the President of Poland or the Minister of Justice can start disciplinary proceedings against Court judges.

21. On the other hand, according to the law, the Court President is appointed by the President of Poland from among three candidates proposed by the General Assembly of Judges in which each judge has only one vote. In effect this means that any grouping of three judges would be able to present a candidate. This leaves considerable discretion to the President of Poland in the appointment process and could allow a Court President to be appointed who does not have the support of the majority of the judges of the Court. Moreover, the law stipulates that the presence of the Prosecutor General is required in all cases before a full bench. In his or her absence, the case in question cannot be heard, potentially allowing the Prosecutor General to block the proceedings before the Court simply by not showing up at a hearing.

22. The new legislation introduces a series of exceptions to the rule that cases should be considered in chronological order and, in addition, allows the President of the Court to change the order of cases in exceptional circumstances to safeguard the individual freedoms of citizens, national security or the constitutional order. While a welcome improvement over previous legislation, it should be up to the Court itself to agree on the order of cases. This provision was appealed to the Constitutional Court which ruled that it violated the principle of separation of powers and therefore was unconstitutional.

23. The new law stipulates that the President of the Court “requests” the publication of the judgements in the official gazette in order for them to come into force, instead of “ordering” the publication, as was the case in the previous legislation. This is an important difference in the context of the refusal of the Prime Minister to publish the decisions of the Court in the context of the constitutional crisis. As mentioned, such refusal is in contradiction with the country’s rule of law obligations and this provision should therefore be changed.

24. On 16 August 2016, the government published 21 judgments of the Constitutional Court, but most notably not the decisions of 9 March and 11 August 2016.

25. On 19 December 2016, the term of office of the President of the Court expired. New legislation that entered into force on the day after the end of the mandate of the President of the Court, no longer focused on the Court’s procedure but on its presidency. It provided that the Court’s General Assembly for the election of candidates for a new President should be chaired not by the Vice-President, who has a constitutional mandate, but by an acting President who would be the judge who has the longest experience in the judiciary in general. This person happened to be a recently appointed judge, Julia Przyłębska

26. The new legislation enabled the election of the candidates for the Court’s President by a minority of the judges, contrary to the Court’s case-law. The “acting President” immediately convened an assembly of judges that proposed three candidates for the position of President of the Court. She herself was one of the candidates. The three contested judges that were “appointed” in December 2015 were allowed to participate and vote in this assembly, which was boycotted by 8 judges. Subsequently she was appointed President of the Court by the President of Poland on 21 December 2016. The new President also sent the Vice-President on forced vacation with immediate effect, thus affecting the Court’s voting majority.

⁶ This is still higher than in most European countries but low enough so as not to endanger the efficient functioning of the Constitutional Court.

27. Practically all interlocutors we met indicated that the Constitutional Court has now been brought under the control of the ruling authorities. At the same time, the, the problems with the composition of the Court that were at the origin of the constitutional crisis have not been resolved. As a result there are three judges participating in the work of the Court whose appointment, on 2 December, is, per decision of the Constitutional Court, illegal. That in turn raises questions about the legality of any of the judgments in which these judges have participated. This undermines the principle of legal certainty in the country.

28. According to Polish Constitutional Law, ordinary courts can rule on the constitutionality of a law or government decision in individual cases before them. This would allow to some extent the continued verification of the constitutionality of laws and government decisions, although by normal courts. This increases the importance of the Supreme Court as the highest court of appeals, including for the uniformity of law with regard to judgements on the constitutionality of contested pieces of legislation and government decisions.

IV. Reform of the justice system

29. Soon after coming to power, the new authorities announced and started a series of reforms of the justice system. In the context of what we described above, in particular in paragraph 27, the reform of the High Council of the Judiciary, also known by its Polish abbreviation KRS, is of particular concern.

30. Under the current Polish Constitution, it is the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), an autonomous body whose judicial members are chosen by their peers, who appoints judges throughout the country. In February 2017, it was reported that the government was planning to reform the National Council of the Judiciary. According to the draft amendments to the law on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts of Poland, the terms of all the judicial members would be terminated within 90 days of the adoption of the draft law. Their replacements would be selected by the Polish Parliament. Moreover, the Council would be split into two chambers, one for judicial members and the other for political representatives. Both chambers would have to agree to an appointment, giving the political representatives a veto over decisions made by the judicial members.

31. The draft law was assessed by the OSCE/ODIHR. In its opinion the OSCE/ODIHR noted that as a result of the proposed amendments the *“legislature rather than the judiciary would appoint the 15 judge representatives...”* on the KRS, which would give the legislative and the executive *“decisive influence over the selection of judges”*. As a result, in the view of the OSCE/ODIHR, the proposed amendments *“raise serious concern with regard to key democratic principles, in particular the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary”*. It concluded that *“if adopted the amendments would undermine the very foundations of a democratic society governed by the rule of law”*. In this context the OSCE/ODIHR recommended that the amendments should be reconsidered in their entirety and not be adopted⁷.

32. Many interlocutors we met in Warsaw saw these amendments as a clear attempt to bring the judiciary under the political control of the authorities, which would undermine, if not destroy, the independence of the judiciary, irrespective of which party should be in power. The risk of politicisation of the KRS was regrettably evident to us when we met the KRS in full committee, when some of the representatives appointed by the parliament seemed to be intent on disrupting the calm conduct of our meeting with this institution.

33. The draft law was adopted in first reading on 5 April 2017. Most interlocutors predicted that it would be adopted in final reading in quick succession. However, reportedly, the law has been the subject of fierce debate and remains under discussion in the parliament and may be considerably amended. Therefore, the Monitoring Committee, at our request, agreed to request an opinion of the Venice Commission on the amendments to the law on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts of Poland, as soon as they are adopted by the parliament and if they differ substantially from the draft that was assessed by the OSCE/ODIHR.

34. Another area that is of potential concern is the amendments to the law on the Prosecution Service that were adopted in March 2016. These amendments, inter alia, abolish the position of an independent Prosecutor General, which was established in 2009, and re-merged that position with that of the Minister of Justice. While also in some other Council of Europe member states the position of Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice are merged, in these countries there exist clear legal provisions that prohibit the Minister of Justice from giving instruction in individual cases, and allow lower level prosecutors to ignore such instruction if inadvertently given. However, such provisions are not present in the Polish legislation, which

⁷ OSCE/ODIHR JUD-POL/305/2017-Final.

could seriously affect the independence of the prosecution service. This is compounded by the reportedly enhanced role in disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors given to the Minister of Justice. Our concern is underscored by the fact that, acting as the Prosecutor General, the Minister of Justice has challenged the election of three Constitutional Court judges who were appointed already in 2010. In parallel, the Prosecutor General/Minister of Justice also challenged the election of the President of the Supreme Court who supported the Constitutional Court in the standoff and who had spoken out against a judicial reform that would severely restrict the independence of the ordinary judiciary. We have not been able to obtain any legal grounds for these challenges.

35. Given the importance of the reform of the Prosecution Service and the concerns raised in this respect the Monitoring Committee, on our proposal, agreed to request the opinion of the Venice Commission on the amended law on the Prosecution Service

V. Law on assemblies

36. In December 2016 the Sejm adopted a series of amendments to the law on assemblies. These amendments, inter alia, stipulate that assemblies can be prohibited if they coincided with so-called cyclical assemblies, which are defined as demonstrations organised by the same organiser at least four times a year or on a yearly basis for more than three years. It was originally proposed that no demonstration would be allowed to coincide with official assemblies organised by the public authorities or by the Church. However this provision was removed during the adoption process. On 29 December 2016, the President sent this law to the Constitutional Court for an opinion on its constitutionality. On 17 March the Constitutional Court ruled that the law was constitutional after which it was signed into force by President Duda

37. During our visit we held several meetings with regard to the law as adopted which laid most of our concerns at rest. In reality it seems that the main effect of this law is to counter demonstrations that are not allowed to take place within a 100 metre perimeter of the demonstration against which they are held. While this may limit counter demonstrations on some occasions we note that several, if not most, member states have public order regulations that spatially separate demonstrations and their counter demonstrations.

38. Some questions with regard to the cyclical status of demonstrations remain. While we are not aware of other member states with similar provisions, this does not mean this would run counter to common standards, unless such cyclical status would only be available to a limited group/type of organisation or demonstration. While we were initially informed that the cyclical status would be reserved for "historical" or "cultural" manifestations, the authorities informed us that this is not the case and there are no such limitations. We intend to clarify this issue during a future visit and in the meanwhile call upon the authorities to indeed ensure that no discriminatory practices occur when attributing cyclical status to demonstrations.

V. Concluding remarks

39. During our visit we also held several meetings on the media environment and the law on the police with regard to surveillance. We would like to thank the authorities for the wealth of information we received, which answered a number of our questions but which also warrants further exploration. We intend to report on these subjects at a future occasion.

APPENDIX 1 – Programme of the fact-finding visit to Warsaw (3–5 April 2017)

Co-rapporteurs: Mr Yves CRUCHTEN, Luxembourg, Socialist Group
Mr Thierry MARIANI, France, Group of the European People's Party

Secretariat: Ms Caroline RAVAUD, Head of Secretariat, Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Mr Bas KLEIN, Deputy Head of Secretariat, Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Main focus of the visit:

- General political developments and state of democracy (including electoral reform)
- Reform of the Constitutional Court and the Judiciary
- Media Reform
- Freedom of Assembly and Expression

Monday, 3 April 2017

14:30 Roundtable with civil society organisations on state of democracy and judicial reform (*)

- Maciej Nowicki, Deputy director, and Małgorzata Szuleka, Lawyer and projects coordinator, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
- Ewa Kulik-Bielińska, director of Stefan Batory Foundation
- Karolina Kędziora, lawyer, Polish Association of the Anti-Discrimination Law
- Filip Pazderski, lawyer, Institute of Public Affairs
- Mirosław Wróblewski, Ph.D., Zbigniew Hołda Association

17:30-18:30 Meeting with the Institute for Legal Culture "Ordo Luris" (*)

18:30-19:30 Meeting with Professor Andrzej Rzepliński, Former President of the Constitutional Tribunal

Tuesday, 4 April 2017

08:00-09:00 Meeting with Mr Paweł Lewandowski, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Culture

09:00-10:00 Meeting with Journalist Association (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy RP)

- Mr Andrzej Maślankiewicz – Secretary General of the association
- Mr Tomasz Miłkowski – expert on international affairs

10:00-11:00 Meeting with high-level officials of the Ministry of Justice

Department of International Cooperation and Human Rights Bureau

- Chairman of the meeting – Mr Krzysztof Masło – Prosecutor, Director
- Mr Paweł Jaros – Judge, Head of International Human Rights Procedures Department
- Mr Paweł Kaczor – Judge, Chief Specialist, International Procedures for Human Rights Protection Department
- Mr Maciej Lis – Specialist, International Human Rights Protection Procedures Department

Administrative Surveillance Bureau

- Mr Łukasz Kurnicki – Judge, Chief Specialist, Improvement of General Courts Department

Human Resources and Organization of Common and Military Courts Bureau

- Mr Paweł Kamiński – Chief Specialist, judicial assistant, National School of Judicial and Prosecutor's Office Department

Legislation Bureau

- Mr Michał Antoniak – Head of Law, System of Common Courts and Prison Service Department

- 11:15-12:30 Meeting with representatives of the National Council of Judiciary: Mr Dariusz Zawistowski, Chairman of NCJ
- 12:45-13:45 Meeting with Journalist Association (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich): Mr Krzysztof Skowroński, Ms Dorota Zielińska
- 14:00-15:00 Meeting with leadership of parliamentary political parties (PiS): Mr Włodzimierz Bernacki, Mr Stanisław Piotrowicz, Mr Krzysztof Czabański, Mr Daniel Milewski
- 15:00-16:00 Meeting with leadership of parliamentary political parties (PO): Mr Andrzej Halicki, Mr Bogdan Klich, Ms Agnieszka Pomaska, Mr Aleksander Pocij, Mr Borys Budka
- 16:00-17:00 Meeting with leadership of parliamentary political parties (Kukiz'15): Mr Paweł Kukiz, Mr Stanisław Tyszka
- 17:00-18:00 Meeting with leadership of parliamentary political parties (Nowoczesna): Ms Katarzyna Lubnauer, Ms Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz, Mr Zbigniew Gryglas
- 18:00-19:00 Meeting with leadership of parliamentary political parties (PSL): Mr Mieczysław Kasprzak

Wednesday, 5 April 2017

- 09:00-10:00 Meeting with bar association: prof. Piotr Kardas, Ms Małgorzata Mączka-Pacholak, barrister
- 10:00-11:00 Meeting with President of the Supreme Court, prof. Małgorzata Gersdorf
- 11:15-12:15 Meeting with Mr Sebastian Chwałek, Undersecretary of State, Minister of Interior
- 12:30-13:30 Meeting with Mr Adam Bodnar, Commissioner for Human Rights, accompanied by Ms Agnieszka Grzelak, Deputy Director, Constitutional, International and European Constitutional Bureau; Ms Aleksandra Kistowska, senior counsellor, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Department, Ms Barbara Kurach, Head, International Cooperation Department
- 13:45-14:30 Meeting with National Broadcasting Council: Mr Krzysztof Czabański, Ms Elżbieta Kruk, Ms Joanna Lichočka
- 14:45-15:45 Meeting with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR)
- 16:00-17:00 Meeting with association of judges "IUSTITIA": Ms Małgorzata Stanek, Ms Monika Frąckowiak, Mr Arkadiusz Tomczak, Mr Tomasz Marczyński

(*) Meetings organised by the Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat